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Abstract
The referendum vote for Remain in Scotland and Northern Ireland and the small majority
for Leave in Wales immediately attracted much attention to the position of the devolved
governments on Brexit negotiations and to the impact of Brexit on their jurisdictions. As the core
of devolved powers relate to social policy, identifying the impact of leaving the EU on aspects of
social policy is highly significant. This article examines the impact of EU programmes, funding,
directives and regulations as delivered in recent years, noting the nature of the participation
of the devolved administrations in EU decision making. The post-referendum concerns of the
devolved governments and their approaches to Brexit and Brexit negotiations are explained.
Also discussed are the likely major changes as well as possible changes that will take place in the
operation of devolution after Brexit.
Introduction
One of the most frequently discussed details of the referendum results was the
differences between Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and England.
The majority vote to Remain in the UK in Scotland and Northern Ireland
has continued to attract attention and discussion and, while the majority vote in
Wales was to leave the EU, this did not align with the views of the Welsh devolved
government. This scenario raises a number of issues: why EU membership had
more support in Scotland and Northern Ireland than in England and Wales; the
impact of the vote to leave the EU on each jurisdiction; and how arrangements
established to implement Brexit will impact on and be influenced by existing
devolution settlements.
A key underpinning factor as devolution became embedded after 1999
was the significance of seeing devolution through the lens of multi-level
governance, as a framework of at least three levels: devolution, the UK
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Table 1. EU Referendum Results
Leave Remain
Scotland 38.0 62.0
Northern Ireland 44.2 55.8
Wales 52.5 47.5
England 53.4 46.6
UK 51.9 48.1
government and the European Union. The Scottish Parliament and Government
has been described as operating within a wider system of multi-level governance
(Keating, 2010; Cairney, 2011) along with UK and EU and local institutions.
Birrell and Gormley-Heenan (2015) describe the governance of Northern
Ireland as a well developed example of multi-level governance with the
EU highly relevant. The framework of multi-level governance has also been
applied to Wales (Cole and Stafford, 2015) and is described by Entwistle
et al. (2014) as co-governance by four levels of government, including local
government.
A key principle of multi-level governance is the division of powers between
levels of government. In the devolved context the allocation of social policy
functions is significant. The particular salience of this is threefold: the allocation
of social policy responsibilities between the UK and the EU; between the UK
and the devolved administrations; and the linkages between the EU and the
devolved administrations. While it is accepted that the influence of the EU in
social policy extended in the 1980s and 90s (Hantrais, 2007), Daly (2007: 2) has
described EU focus on social policy as ‘fitful’ with ‘periods of intense activity
followed by times when social policy is hardly spoken of’. The broad perspective
is that the EU has limited competence over social policy with member states
having maintained direct control over the main areas of social policy, including
health and social protection (Naumann and Brodie, 2016). The spectrum of
regulation and directives in terms of social policy supports the view that EU
social policy intervention is largely regulatory and closely linked to economic
and employment-related issues (Clasen, 2012).
The EU/UK relationship, and within the UK the view that the Westminster
government has jurisdiction over EU affairs, has to be set against a consequence of
the devolution settlement – that most social policy powers are devolved matters.
Key areas of interest are therefore what impact EU membership has had on
social policy in the devolved administrations and how they developed their
engagement and relationships with the EU. Such analysis provides the context
for explaining the post-referendum responses of the devolved administrations
and their interpretations of the implications of Brexit. Their views have, in part,
been moulded by fears of the effects of Brexit on social policy and the insufficient
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279417000393
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 5.80.166.185, on 19 Aug 2020 at 14:33:06, subject to the Cambridge Core
brexit for scotland, wales and northern ireland 767
notice taken by the Westminster government of the concerns of the devolved
administrations.
The devolved governments and EU decision making
A fundamental constitutional principle is that EU matters are not devolved
and therefore the sole responsibility of the UK government. However, the UK
government recognised that many of the areas for which the EU had responsibility
did impact on devolved policies (Jeffrey and Palmer, 2007) and arrangements were
established to accommodate the devolved administrations in EU affairs. They
were given an official role in co-operation with the UK government on EU matters
through an overarching concordat applying broadly uniform arrangements for
each devolved administration (Whitman, 2017). This contained a commitment
to the involvement of the devolved administrations in discussions about the
formulation of UK policy on all EU issues touching on devolved matters. This
inter-governmental co-operation became more institutionalised through a sub-
committee of the Joint Ministerial Council (JMC), consisting of UK and devolved
ministers deliberating ahead of each scheduled European Council meeting.
Involvement in EU decisions included devolved ministers attending EU council
meetings with the agreement of the lead UK departmental minister. This practice
normally involved agriculture and fisheries but also the environment, energy,
education and justice.
The devolved administrations also developed contacts with EU decision
makers outside of the formal UK/EU structures through meetings with EU
commissioners, committees and officials (Bulmer et al., 2006). Plans were
published for furthering Scottish (Smith, 2010) and Welsh engagement with the
EU (Welsh Assembly Government, 2009). Advised by the then President of the
European Commission, Mr Barroso, the Northern Ireland government produced
an action plan on increasing EU involvement (Northern Ireland Executive, 2009).
Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales all set up offices in Brussels as part of the
UK Permanent Representation, more akin, as Cole and Stafford (2015) note,
to a diplomatic mission than a standard regional office. These facilitated the
countries pursuing their interests and liaising with the offices of other European
regions. While they were members of the Committee of the Regions they were
also able to join the strongest regions in the Committee with legislative powers.
Scotland used EU membership to forge co-operation arrangements with the
regions of Catalonia, Tuscany, Bavaria and Flanders, and with some countries,
for example, Estonia. Wales was linked on an equal basis with regions including
Catalonia, Sicily, and the state of Latvia. The EU arena could be described as
providing a new structure of opportunities for the devolved administrations. The
relationship the devolved governments developed with the EU can also be seen in
their membership of EU networks. Some are formal, such as the Confederation
of Regions with Legislative Assemblies; others are based on an interest, such
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Table 2. Combined Allocation of ERDF and ESF Funding for 2014–20 (€
million)
England NI Scotland Wales
Total allocation 6937 613 895 2413
Per capita allocation 131 338 169 788
Source: (Hunt et al., 2016)
as the Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development, the
Confederation of Peripheral and Maritime Regions and the European Regions
for Research and Innovation.
Despite these arrangements, and the overlap in responsibility between
the EU, UK and devolved governments in a number of policy areas such as
agriculture and the environment (Whitman, 2017), it has become clear that the
devolved administrations will have limited input into or control over the Brexit
negotiations. Comments made by the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, following
the supreme court ruling in January 2017 (The Supreme Court, 2017) that the UK
government was not legally compelled to consult the devolved administrations
before invoking Article 50, point to a more legalistic approach by the Prime
Minister. This positions the UK government as the negotiating party with little
scope for the devolved governments to negotiate any separate arrangements with
the EU (The Independent, 2017; Hansard, 2017; House of Commons, 2017).
Impact of the EU on social policy in the devolved administrations
EU funding
EU funding has influenced devolved social policies in a number of respects
which can be described as follows: the impact of EU funding programmes in
the devolved administrations; regulations and directives covering employment,
movement of labour, higher education and equal rights; and, in Northern Ireland,
the impact of the EU on peace building and cross-border movement and co-
operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
There has been a particularly significant impact on regional and rural policy
with governments having considerable control over the design and distribution
of the funding. Setting aside agriculture and the EU Common Agricultural
Policy, the most significant support comes through the European Structural
and Investment Funds (structural funds). These are focused on the development
of the EU’s poorest regions. Two of the funds have had a particular influence
on social policy: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the
European Social Fund (ESF) and these have been primarily targeted investment
in infrastructure, education and training. Table 2 shows the combined allocation
of ERDF and ESF funding for the period 2014–20.
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Table 3. Composition of JMC (EU Negotiations)
Chair Secretary of State for Exiting the EU
UK Government Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland; Minister of State, Department for Exiting the
EU;
Minister of State, Foreign Office
Scottish Government Minister for UK Negotiation on Scotland’s place in Europe
Welsh Government Cabinet Secretary for Finance
Northern Ireland Executive First and Deputy First Ministers
Source: Department for Exiting the EU (2016)
The devolved administrations have had responsibility for distributing this
funding to projects. In the case of the European Social Fund, Scotland and
Wales adopted similar cross-cutting themes of equal opportunity, sustainable
employment, and tackling poverty and social exclusion. Scotland has been able
to pursue a strategy of priorities for reducing poverty, boosting education
attainment and skills, growing employment, and climate change and energy
saving. In the period 2007–13, structural funds were seen as significant in
improving employment for those furthest from the labour market. Wales has
the highest allocation of structural funds in absolute terms which have been
strongly targeted on training and skills to address poverty resulting from
unemployment, economic inactivity and youth unemployment but have also
been used to improve public administration and partnership working through
local service boards (Miller Research UK, 2017). Structural funds, together with
European Investment Bank support, have made a major contribution to new
higher education infrastructure in Scotland and Wales, including the building of
Swansea University and Swansea Bay Science Park (LSE European Institute, 2016;
Macpherson, 2016).
In Northern Ireland, Structural Fund allocation has also had a strong
economic focus. The ERDF has been used to promote investment in research
and development and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the ESF
to tackle economic inactivity focusing on people with no/low qualifications.
The ERDF funding is also linked to some special programmes relating to
Northern Ireland and Scotland. Interreg, an established programme to assist
border regions in the EU and promote cross-border co-operation, is now
part of the European Territorial Cooperation programme. Under Intereg VA
programme, the border counties of the Republic of Ireland and the west of
Scotland have been identified as eligible areas. The programme has funding
of €240 million and the four priority topics are: research, the environment,
transport, and health and social care. Projects in health and social care have
included cross-border co-operation in services, support for voluntary and
community bodies and assistance for providers. Another initiative is the EU
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Ireland-Wales programme designed to deliver social, economic and environ-
mental benefits to maritime areas. One major project under this programme
to date is funding £9 million to expand the life sciences sector across five
universities.
A unique EU funding programme impacting on Northern Ireland is the
Special Fund for Peace and Reconciliation. Existing since 1995 it is a direct result
of a decision by the EU to make a positive contribution to support the peace
process in Northern Ireland. It has been a cross-border programme covering
the whole of Northern Ireland and the six border counties of the Republic of
Ireland. Funding is mainly from ERDF and has been substantial over the four
versions of the programme. The overall objective is to promote socio-economic
stability and cohesion between communities, and projects mainly cover: shared
education, children and young people, disadvantaged groups, victims of the
conflict, and improving community relations. The current programme, Peace 4,
is targeted at children and young people. The three previous Peace programmes
between 1995 and 2013 contributed €1.3 billion and Peace 4 has a value of €270
million. The programmes are administered by a cross-border implementation
body, the Special EU Programmes Body. These cross-border funds have also been
important to the voluntary sectors with multi-sectoral partnerships encouraged
(McCall and Williamson, 2000) and have supported substantial employment in
the sector. The Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action (NICVA) has
estimated that, from 2007–13, the overall level of EU funding allocation to the
voluntary and community sector in Northern Ireland has been £74.4m (NICVA,
2015).
The UK is one of the largest beneficiaries of EU research funding from the
Structural Investment Funds and Horizon 2020. The latter is the biggest EU
research and innovation programme with a threefold focus on science; industrial
leadership; and health, demographic change and well-being. Scotland has been
particularly successfully in securing Horizon 2020 funding with institutions
awarded €296 million since 2014, representing 11.4 per cent of the UK funding
awards and 9.4 per cent of Scottish universities total research income for 2014–
15 (Scottish Affairs Committee, 2016: 6). A study of Horizon 2020 by the
Scottish European and External Relations Committee regarded it as one of
the most significant opportunities for Scottish institutions (Scottish Parliament,
2012). Horizon 2020 funding has also been an important source of funding
for higher education institutions in Wales and Northern Ireland. Wales has
obtained funding in the region of £45 million for 95 projects with over half
going to Welsh higher education institutions. Horizon 2020 also encourages
transnational partnerships and this has been significant in Northern Ireland
with a number of north-south collaborative projects and the projects have
had a focus on collaboration in health and more generally on support for
SMEs.
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Directives and regulations
The laws establishing the Scottish Parliament and Assemblies in Wales and
Northern Ireland include a requirement to comply with EU law and responsibility
for implementing EU obligations where they relate to devolved matters. As
Gordon and Moffett (2016) detail, The Scotland Act 1998 stipulates that Acts
of the Scottish Parliament that are incompatible with EU law are outside the
legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. The Government of Wales Act
2006 provides that any Act of the Welsh Assembly that is incompatible with EU
law, falls outside its competence and Section 24 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998
prohibits any legislation that is contrary to EU law.
Across the three categories of EU law: EU regulations and parts of EU
treaties which are directly applied without the need for national law; EU directives
implemented through Acts of Parliament; and UK regulations made to implement
directives, there are potential issues for the devolved governments arising from
decisions about the status of EU directives and regulations post Brexit. Areas
covered by EU directives and regulations include many areas of devolved
responsibility covering social policy, economics, social cohesion, consumer
protection, safety and public health. Among the most significant directives for
social policy have been those relating to the working time directive, agency
workers’ rights and maternity rights incorporated into the GB Equality Act 2010
(Georghiou and Evans, 2016). Freedom of movement regulations have brought
many workers from member states into public services in all parts of the UK. In
Wales it is estimated that, of 69,000 workers who have moved from EU states,
one-third work in the public services (Zolle, 2016). There has been considerable
influence also in the area of health regulations including procedures for medical
and clinical trials and drugs used in the EU, reciprocal access to health care,
recognition of professional qualifications, funding of medical research and cross-
border projects; the latter is particularly important in Ireland (Thompson, 2016).
Post-referendum response and negotiations
Following the referendum much attention fell on the majority votes in Scotland
and Northern Ireland for Remain and the complex political and constitutional
issues created by the UK majority vote to leave the EU. Each of the devolved
governments is run by a party or parties different to the party in power in
Westminster. All three take a different approach to future UK/EU relationships
than that being adopted by Westminster. In Wales, while there was a majority
vote for Leave, the First Minister stressed that Wales must be able to play a full
role in negotiations to leave the EU to ensure the interests of the Welsh people
were protected, that the UK should retain access to the single market and that
acceptance of a final deal should be subject to the support of the four parliaments
(Welsh Government, 2016).
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The referendum results led to the devolved governments declaring different
positions on the negotiations, in part explained by their prior attitudes to
and involvement with the EU and their economies. The view of the Scottish
government was that, if Scotland was taken out of the EU against its will, it would
be acceptable to hold another independence referendum (Cram, 2016). Five Brexit
tests were proposed for preserving Scotland’s interests: democracy; economic
prosperity; social protection; solidarity and influence (Scottish Government,
2016a). Maintaining access to the single market and freedom of movement were
identified as red lines. A bill to have a second independence referendum was
published for consultation and a panel to give expert advice was established.
The position of the Northern Ireland Executive was more complex with the two
parties who shared power, the DUP and Sinn Fein, adopting different positions
on the referendum. Northern Ireland is also unique as the only part of the UK
which, after Brexit, would have a land border with an EU member state. There was
consensus within Northern Ireland that there should be no impediment to the
cross-border movement of people, goods and services and that all parties should
work to secure the best deal for Northern Ireland following Brexit (Northern
Ireland Executive Office, 2016).
The devolved governments expressed the desire to be fully involved in
discussions and negotiations in recognition of the impact of leaving the EU on the
devolved administrations. The Prime Minister made early visits to the devolved
countries and even referred to a UK approach and objectives but, a short time later,
Philip Hammond, Chancellor of the Exchequer, stated there would be no special
deal for Scotland and Theresa May made it clear that the actual negotiations
would be a matter for her government alone. After a meeting between the Prime
Minister and her devolved counterparts in October 2016, the Scottish and Welsh
First Ministers expressed frustration at the apparent ambivalence of the Prime
Minister towards the devolved administrations. While some action has been
taken to provide a basis for consultation with the JMC Europe sub-committee to
meet more regularly the value of this has been questioned with claims that, as an
institutional arrangement, the JMC is not suited to developing a joint position
on the EU (Whitman, 2017; House of Commons, 2017). The UK government
controls the JMC agenda and has no obligation to explain or publically account
for decisions (Paun and Miller, 2016: 9). The first JMC (EU negotiations) was
held in November 2016 with agreement to meet monthly and develop a work
programme. The attendance (see Table 1) represents mainly junior UK ministers,
the Secretaries of State and devolved ministers. To date, meetings have considered
the initial priorities of the devolved governments and the subjects of market
access, justice and security, immigration and trade (Department for Exiting the
EU, 2016).
There was also surprise and criticism that the Cabinet sub-committee,
overseeing the Brexit negotiations and the formation of a new relationship
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between the UK and the EU, does not have the three Secretaries of State for
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as formal members. As noted earlier, while
constitutionally the relationship with the EU is a reserved matter, attention has
also been drawn to the extent that EU law is embedded in devolved law. The
assertion of the UK government of its right to make decisions for the UK with
regard to Brexit also has to be set against the reality that the devolution settlement
has created powerful legislative bodies with legitimacy bestowed through public
referendums (Paun and Miller, 2016: 9). The devolved settlement in Northern
Ireland is also underpinned by an international agreement strongly supported by
the EU and the USA.
Concerns of the devolved administrations
Concerns and fears have tended to be dominated by the possible economic
consequences and uncertainties. For governments in Wales and Scotland,
maintaining access to the Single Market has been a priority (Welsh Government,
2017; Scottish Government, 2016) and all three devolved administrations have
expressed concern about restrictions on freedom of movement and the potential
loss of migrant workers. As discussed earlier, all have made significant efforts to
develop formal and informal networks across the EU and it is also evident they
fear losing their place in Europe.
The Scottish government has been the most critical of the whole Brexit
enterprise. It sees the UK government’s approach as posing unacceptable risks
to Scotland’s democratic, economic and social interests and the rights of the
Scottish Parliament. McGarvey and Stewart (2016) base Scotland’s concerns
on a rejection of British insularity, a view of Scotland as an open and equal
society with European involvement, a large welfare state and self-government.
EU membership has been seen as contributing to Scotland’s prosperity and to
the rights of those living in Scotland (Scottish Parliament, 2016a). Scotland has
also welcomed European immigration as necessary to develop the economic
response to labour shortages and population decline. About 180,000 now UK-
EU residents are living in Scotland, accounting for 20 per cent of the workforce
in education, health and public administration. The Scottish Programme for
Government (Scottish Government, 2016b) makes building Scotland’s place in
the world including Europe a major priority. This vision is accompanied by more
practical concerns over aspects of social policies. There are fears over the loss of
structural funds after 2020, and an adverse effect on the retention of employment,
training, skills and living standards, the impact on the voluntary sector and
further education, and on rural development, urban regeneration and transport.
Concerns also relate to possible loss of social protection for employees, vulnerable
groups and women and the threat to well established networks between civil
society organisations in Scotland and organisations throughout the EU (Scottish
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Parliament, 2016a:17). The view that the EU has been good for Scotland has also
been articulated by local government, with reference to the quantity and length
of funding programmes and contacts throughout Europe (COSLA, 2016). On 28
March 2017, the Scottish Government won support in parliament for a second
referendum on Scottish Independence but the UK government has indicated that
it will not allow a vote before the conclusion of the Brexit negotiations.
The Welsh government has been in a more difficult position in that there
was a Leave outcome to the referendum. It has emphasised pursuing the social
and economic interests of the Welsh people, expressing a vision of a strong
business environment while also delivering strong public services (Jones, 2016).
Given that Wales is a net beneficiary of EU funding there is much concern
at the likely impact on public services (Zolle, 2016: 5). The Welsh Assembly
has produced a lengthy list of concerns including health and other social
policy issues. Attention has been drawn to dependency on staffing from the
EU, coordination of health care coverage, combatting epidemics, recognition
of professional qualifications, medical research co-operation and funding, and
cross-border health. The Welsh Local Government Association, describing the
change as seismic, has also expressed fears over protection for structural funds,
workforce rights, anti-pollution measures and the role of the many networks and
programmes for territorial co-operation. These cover local council networks,
and topics such as urban regeneration, European cities, maritime and rural
areas. Fears over agriculture and rural development, the environment, energy,
and connectivity have also been detailed with their impact on public health and
well-being (National Assembly for Wales, 2016). Brexit has also raised major fears
that the third sector in Wales will be under severe strain and be a financial loser
post-Brexit (Fiander and Williams, 2016). Concern at the future absence of the
European Investment Bank has also been expressed, given its direct investment
of £2 billion in Wales including support for university buildings.
There has been more limited expression of concern by the Northern Ireland
Executive because of deep political cleavages between the two main parties. This
has been exacerbated by the collapse of the political institutions in January 2017.
Consensus between the two main parties in Northern Ireland has been largely
limited to a joint letter to the Prime Minister stressing areas of concern for
Northern Ireland focusing on the need to avoid a hard border, labour mobility,
energy, and agri-food trade. Much of the other concerns expressed in Northern
Ireland have related to the fears of the large voluntary sector which is dependent
on structural funds and also EU peace funds.
EU membership gave Ireland and the UK a forum for co-operation across a
wide range of policy areas and provided incentives not to disturb the Anglo Irish
relationship or change the context for dealing with the border in uncertain ways.
In practice, the main political concern is that the Irish border could become the
main border point between the UK and the EU. There are two dimensions to the
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issue. Firstly, the movement of people across the border, relating to the Common
Travel Area (CTA) and the introduction of the EU single market between Ireland,
Northern Ireland and Britain and the largely open border policy. The CTA has
existed since 1922 and is an arrangement between the UK and Ireland whereby
legal provision exists in both jurisdictions to allow people living in either country
free movement across the islands and access to employment, services and benefits
(de Mars et al., 2017). The introduction of the Single European Market eradicated
the need for customs controls between the north and south of Ireland. The UK
government’s stated intention to leave the European customs union as well as
the EU single market raises issues about the imposition of customs controls
and the introduction of a hard border. An economic analysis has suggested that
the customs union is more important for Northern Ireland as it will become
a more immediate and visible barrier to trade on the island of Ireland in the
event of a hard Brexit (Nevin Economic Research Institute, 2016). Secondly, the
fear that some of the key arrangements in the peace process implementation
would be compromised (Irish Government, 2017; McAleese, 2017; Tonge, 2016).
In particular there is concern about cross-border bodies which provide services
to an EU area and a non-EU area, and the perception of the EU as providing
overarching support to maintain political stability. Summed up, the fear is really
that Northern Ireland cannot afford to see a change in current arrangements
regarding the free movement of goods, services, capital or people (Phinnemore,
2016).
Post-Brexit: predicting changes, impact and future scenarios
A great deal of uncertainty remains regarding who will have policy making
authority following the Great Repeal Bill. The White Paper on legislating
for exiting the EU (Department for Exiting the EU, 2017), while stating that
‘the expectation of the Government that the outcome of this process will
be a significant increase in the decision making power of each devolved
administration’ (para 4.5) provides no detail on this. At the same time, there
is also the suggestion that some of the EU powers for devolved policy areas
could be returned to the UK government so that Westminster can create a
‘UK policy framework’. Governments in Scotland and Wales are clear that they
expect EU competences in the devolved policy areas would lie with the devolved
administrations. The assumption by the UK government that some of these
powers would be centralised can be seen as highly problematic (McEwan, 2017;
Drakeford, 2017).
There will be some change in the scale and nature of administrative functions,
with the removal of the EU involvement in, for example, agriculture and rural
development. There will be a whole range of transitions in delivering services
relating to university research funding, social funds, and the environment. As
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outlined earlier, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales are more dependent on
funding for agriculture, regional and rural development than England. However,
there is no guarantee that the UK government will continue with similar area-
based policies. While there is strong support for these in the devolved countries,
as Bell (2017) outlines, there has been criticism of the effectiveness and cost
efficiency of these EU funding mechanisms. If the decision is made to continue
with this funding post-Brexit, there would still be issues relating to the priority
attached to each area of spending and how funding would be allocated to
the devolved administrations. It is highly possible that an outcome of Brexit
will be changes to the Barnett Formula. This process determines the overall
financial resources for devolved expenditure, and expenditure on health, social
care, education, children’s services, housing and planning dominates the existing
patterns. Allocation of funds by the UK government for areas previously covered
by EU funding could be allocated to the devolved administrations through the
Barnett Formula. This is likely to be an attractive option for the UK government
in terms of seeming the simplest administrative solution but it would present
a number of challenges. If, for example, Treasury expenditure on agricultural
subsidies in England were to be reduced, this would automatically reduce the
Barnett allocation. In addition, the Barnett Formula is not related to need,
bringing the risk that funding would not be used for higher priority needs
(Bell, 2017; Drakeford, 2017). Bell (2017) has conducted an analysis of possible
outcomes for dealing with EU area-based policies, i.e. EU agricultural, regional
and rural policies.
He suggests that if the UK government decided to maintain this policy
approach there are three possible options. Firstly, use of the Barnett Formula
which, while reasonably transparent, would be linked to the UK’s fiscal position.
This would give devolved governments policy autonomy and could lead to
reduced funding in other areas. Secondly, the assignation of equivalent revenues
to the devolved administrations using agreed criteria giving them greater freedom
to determine expenditure but with increased use of disputes. Thirdly, agreeing a
level of support and devolving autonomy for raising a proportion of the revenue
through additional tax, which does carry a risk regarding the amount of revenue
which could be raised.
Obviously there are many unknowns about possible changes: whether there
will be extra funding for public services across the UK; whether there will be
compensatory funding for the loss of EU structural funds after 2020; whether
special arrangements will be made to continue support for universities through
Horizon 2020 and Erasmus; whether the same level of social protection for part-
time workers, and other social rights, will be maintained; and whether a flexible
work permit system may be introduced. The task of assessing and dealing with
EU legislation on the UK statute book will involve the devolved countries in what
has been described as a gargantuan exercise. It is estimated in Scotland alone that
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there are 3,500 items of legislation, regulation, directives and decisions (Scottish
Parliament, 2016b:13).
The legislation setting up devolution will be amended, removing the
specification that the devolved legislations have to be compatible with EU law.
Extension to devolved powers or the transfer of new powers would mean that
policy competence would be extended (Scottish Parliament, 2016b:3). This may
give the devolved administrations power to decide whether to retain domestic
legislation which implements EU directives. Matters of employment protection
and regulations could be devolved to Scotland and Wales (these powers are already
devolved to Northern Ireland). A House of Lords committee has recommended
that aspects of immigration control and work permits might be devolved to
reflect needs in Northern Ireland, arguments which apply to Scotland and Wales,
and in the context of the Irish border (House of Lords, 2016). The Scottish
government has suggested that, in relation to repatriation from the EU, powers
relating to immigration, employment law, equality, and health and safety at
work – as well as other powers over making international agreements, financial
services, professional regulation and social protections – could be devolved
(Scottish Government, 2016, para. 185). Brexit may actually lead to the removal of
some blockages to decision making by the devolved administrations such as the
restrictions on Scotland imposing minimum alcohol pricing under competition
laws, and to Scotland’s private finance programme which has been called into
doubt by stricter EU rules on public spending.
Post Brexit relationships between Northern Ireland, Ireland, the
UK and the EU
Due to the differences in views between the two main political parties in Northern
Ireland on Brexit and the collapse of the Executive, in comparison to Scotland and
Wales the Northern Ireland Executive has published little on the Brexit process
and post-Brexit scenarios. Sinn Fein is continuing to argue for special status for
Northern Ireland during and after the Brexit negotiations. It has also called for
a referendum on Irish unity although there is no support for this from the UK
or Irish Government. The DUP, as a pro-Brexit party, continues to stress the
UK-wide referendum result and the potential benefits to Northern Ireland from
Brexit.
Significant attention has been focused on the border, including by the
European Council. The threat to the existence of a seamless border, far removed
from the long customs queues and military checkpoints of the past has been a key
concern (House of Commons, 2017, para 89 and 112). Over thirty-thousand people
cross the border on a daily basis for work and there are multiple cross-border
enterprises and projects. However, post-Brexit the border between Northern
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland will become an international border between
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279417000393
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 5.80.166.185, on 19 Aug 2020 at 14:33:06, subject to the Cambridge Core
778 derek birrell and ann marie gray
the EU and the UK. The UK government, Irish government, Northern Ireland
political parties and the European Council have spoken of the need to avoid a hard
border. That this issue features prominently in the guidelines for negotiations
published by the European Council following the UK’s notification to trigger
Article 50 (European Council, 2017), and that it is one of three issues the EU
requires resolution on before proceeding to full negotiations, is testament to the
importance attached to it.
Brexit obviously has very significant implications for the Republic of Ireland,
particularly with regard to trade and the maintenance of peace and stability on
the island. The Irish government has referred to its work on Brexit as the ‘largest
undertakings of the Irish Government over the last fifty years’ (Irish Government,
2017: 4). The Irish economy is heavily reliant on the UK as a trading partner with
17 per cent (€39bn) of all exports going to the UK and 14 per cent (€30bn) of
all imports sourced from the UK (Irish Government, 2017). The maintenance of
a soft border and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, as well as institutions and
the body of human rights protections contained within the agreement, are seen
as inviolable. The Irish Foreign Minister has warned that ‘This is regardless of
whether or not the UK remains within the European convention on human rights
or not [post-Brexit]. It is important to remember that the Good Friday agreement
is an international treaty, registered with the UN. I hope that all sides understand
that this means its provisions – all of them – are inviolable.’ (Flanagan, 2017).
Conclusions
The arrangements to date for the engagement of the devolved administrations
in the Brexit process have been regarded as unsatisfactory by the devolved
administrations and by Westminster committees (House of Lords, 2016; The
House of Commons, 2017). It is recognised that the competences of the devolved
countries will be affected by Brexit but reaching a firm conclusion on the impact of
Brexit on the devolved administrations is complex and uncertain. The positions
and concerns of the devolved administrations do not receive much sympathy
and are not well understood within the UK cabinet or in Whitehall. The analysis
in this article would suggest main considerations which relate to the devolved
governments and the operation of devolution, all of which have implications for
aspects of social policy. The considerations are: the loss of EU programmes and
regulations relating to entitlements and equality; the impact on the economy;
financial implications for the devolved administrations; the potential impact of
changes to devolved powers; and specific issues relating to Northern Ireland,
including the land border with the Republic of Ireland.
The loss of direct funding under the structural funds has been identified as
a major difficulty for aspects of social policy in Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland. There is some consensus that the UK government should replace some
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of the loss of funding after Brexit ends current arrangements. The wider impact
of economic developments following Brexit is of much concern, especially the
potential consequences for wages, employment, standards of living and particular
important economic activities such as the agri-food industries and the associated
well-being of rural communities. An issue for the devolved governments is the
impact of Brexit on the operation of the Barnett Formula and the allocations from
the UK Treasury. The issue of repatriation of EU powers and responsibilities has
not received a great deal of detailed attention, including in the UK government’s
White Paper on exiting the EU, but is a matter of considerable importance to
the devolved administrations. Repatriation should lead to an enhancement of
devolved powers in areas already constitutionally devolved, particularly in the
areas of agriculture, rural development and fisheries. The Scottish government
has proposed some other matters would be better devolved to suit Scotland’s
needs, such as employment rights and protections. The whole area of employment
is already devolved to Northern Ireland. A case can be made for other areas of
social protection, relating to equality and aspects of social security, to be devolved
in the context of repatriation of powers.
The political dynamic of Brexit does differ between the three countries. The
Scottish government has led the way in pressing for a form of differentiated
solution and is demanding a solution that will allow Scotland to remain part of
the single market and the European Economic Area. The SNP continues to be
committed to exploring the arrangements for a second independence referendum
as a response to Brexit, to be held following the outcome of the Brexit negotiations.
The Welsh government has also declared a desire to have continuing access to the
single market. Also attracting support has been the idea of a separate immigration
policy or policy covering visas and work permits for the devolved countries. If
there is reluctance to establish special arrangements for Scotland and Wales, it
may be that Northern Ireland is in a stronger position to obtain a bespoke Brexit
given: features of the Common Travel Area between Ireland and the UK; the fact
that people in Northern Ireland are entitled to become Citizens of the EU simply
by applying for an Irish passport; the need to maintain a common trade area; the
existence of cross-border implementation bodies delivering services across what
will be an EU/non-EU border; and the possible threat of undermining the Good
Friday Agreement. A hard Brexit may mean that the devolved administrations
are likely to adopt a similar approach to that developed when confronted with
welfare reform, using devolved powers in relation to social policy to, as far as
possible, mitigate the most damaging effects of Brexit.
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